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N Ex parte Werne,1 the applicant was arrested on Texas state of-
fenses. He satisfied these sentences in jail, but remained in custody
because of a warrant out of Mississippi. After spending two months
in jail, without counsel and without bond set, the applicant filed an appli-
cation for habeas corpus relief. Over two months after the application
was filed, the trial court released the applicant on a $5,000 bond. In the
interim, a warrant was issued in Texas for the applicant's arrest based on
the Mississippi charges, and thus the applicant was rearrested. He again
filed an application for habeas corpus, contending that the trial court's
error in not granting proper relief on his first application denied him his
constitutional right to liberty and that this deprivation could not be cured
by the subsequent warrant. The Texarkana Court of Appeals disagreed,
holding that, while the trial court erred in not granting the applicant a
faster hearing on his first application and in not releasing him uncondi-
tionally, any error was harmless because the warrant was indisputably
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In Shaw v. State,3 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals considered
whether the Texarkana Court of Appeals erred when it held that a thirty-
eight month delay in bringing defendant to trial violated his right to a
speedy trial. The Court of Criminal Appeals began its analysis by stating
that a trial court must employ a "balancing test in which the conduct of
both the State and the defendant are weighed."'4 The court found that a
one-year delay triggers a speedy trial inquiry, and in this inquiry, the
court balanced the State's proffered reasons for the delay, the defen-
dant's own motion for continuance and the trial court's crowded docket.
The Court of Criminal Appeals found that the trial court's crowded
docket weighed against the State, but that the defendant had not sought a
"speedy trial ...until [twenty-nine] months after his first trial," which
had ended in a mistrial, and that the defendant had not been prejudiced
because he had been out on bond and had not demonstrated "any unu-
sual anxiety or concern" in the interim.5 Weighing these factors, the
Court of Criminal Appeals found that the factors weighed against a find-
ing that appellant's right to a speedy trial was violated and reversed the
court of appeals. 6
Similarly, the Corpus Christi-Edinburg Court of Appeals held that a
seventeen-and-a-half month delay did not violate Fifth or Sixth Amend-
ment rights to a speedy trial. 7 The court in State v. McCoy found that
"the preindictment delay was due to ... [the] thorough investigation of
the case" and that the additional five-and-a-half month delay to the start
of the trial was due to the court's crowded docket.8 Further, the court
opined that the defendant's assertion of the right was merely to have the
trial court dismiss the indictment and not to actually have a speedy trial
since defense counsel first asked for a continuance to seek witnesses. 9
Finally, the court found that while the defendant suffered from some anx-
iety while awaiting trial, it did not impair his defense. 10
A. INDICTMENT
In Lopez v. State,"l the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals barred two
separate convictions based upon a single sale of a controlled substance as
a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Appellant contacted an un-
dercover officer and negotiated the sale of cocaine. 12 Later that day, ap-
2. Id. at 837-38.
3. Shaw v. State, 117 S.W.3d 883 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
4. Id. at 888 (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972); Harris v. State, 827
S.W.3d 949, 956 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)).
5. Id. at 890.
6. Id. at 891.
7. State v. McCoy, 94 S.W.3d 296, 305 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christ 2002, no pet.).
8. Id. at 302.
9. Id. at 303.
10. Id. at 305.
11. Lopez v. State, 108 S.W.3d 293 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
12. Id. at 294.
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pellant met with the officer at a mall and participated in the delivery of
the cocaine. Appellant was charged and convicted of two separate counts
of controlled substance violations under Section 481.112 of the Texas
Health and Safety Code. The first court charged that Lopez intentionally
or knowingly delivered a controlled substance by offering to sell the con-
trolled substance. The second count alleged that Lopez intentionally or
knowingly possessed a controlled substance with intent to deliver the sub-
stance. The jury found Lopez "guilty on both counts and sentenced him
to twenty-five years imprisonment for each count. '13
Lopez appealed, arguing that he was convicted twice for the same of-
fense in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. That clause protects
individuals against multiple convictions for the same offense. 14 There-
fore, the Court of Criminal Appeals needed to determine whether "the
Legislature intend[ed] each step taken toward [a] single sale itself consti-
tutes a different violation of the statute."' 5 The court concluded that the
legislature intended that the statute provide several different means for
committing one offense. The State may charge the offense under one or
any of the different modes of violation, but "it cannot obtain two convic-
tions for the same sale.' 6 Therefore, the court held that "[tihe entry of
two convictions [was improper] because the steps in this single drug trans-
action were all 'the result of the original impulse,' and therefore each step
was not a 'new bargain.'"1 7
B. VOIR DIRE
In Roberts v. State,18 the appellant made several complaints about jury
selection in his trial wherein he was convicted of delivery of a controlled
substance. The Tyler Court of Appeals first held that, while it was error
for the trial court to sua sponte order a jury shuffle after the commence-
ment of voir dire, any error was harmless because the resultant panel
would still be entirely random. 19 The court of appeals next found that,
while a juror may be equivocal about his ability to disregard the defen-
dant's choice not to take the stand, the appellate court must defer to the
trial court's judgment regarding whether that juror will follow the court's
instruction. 20 Finally, the court of appeals found that the trial court did
not err in informing a prospective juror about his right to seek an exemp-
tion if he was over the age of sixty-five so long as the juror himself exer-
cised the exemption and the court did not order the juror removed on
that basis.2 1
13. Id. at 295.
14. Id. at 295 (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969)).
15. Id. at 296.
16. Id. at 300.
17. Id. at 300-01.
18. Roberts v. State, No. 12-94-00295-CR, 2003 WL 22204995 (Tex. App.-Tyler Sept.
24, 2003, no pet.).
19. Id. at *1.
20. Id. at *2 (citing Brown v. State, 913 S.W.2d 577, 580 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)).
21. Id. at *3.
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In Simpson v. State,22 the appellant, convicted of capital murder, chal-
lenged the propriety of jury selection. First, he argued that he was denied
his statutory right to question a juror who stated that she opposed the
death penalty when the trial court granted the state's challenge to the
juror without giving the defense the opportunity to question her. The
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals agreed that this was error, but found
that such error was harmless because the record demonstrated that "it
[was] highly unlikely that the appellant would have been able to con-
vince" the prospective juror to change her position.2 3 The court of crimi-
nal appeals also rejected the appellant's Batson challenge, finding that the
prosecution's statement that it struck certain jurors because they knew
people in prison did not evince "inherently discriminatory intent. '24
II. TRIAL
The Texarkana Court of Appeals considered the effect of television
cameras in the courtroom in a criminal trial in Graham v. State.25 A jury
convicted the appellant pursuant to his guilty plea of arson and sentenced
him to seventy years in prison and a $10,000 fine. One of appellant's
grounds for appeal was the trial court's decision to permit cameras in the
courtroom during his trial.2 6 The court of appeals noted that "the trial
court has the power to control the procedural aspects of a case," includ-
ing whether to permit cameras in the courtroom. 27 The court admitted
that while cameras can sometimes cause a "circus atmosphere .... there is
nothing in [the] record to suggest the existence ... of [an] inappropriate
atmosphere. '28 Accordingly, the court held "under this record, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by permitting the media to remain in the
courtroom. '"29 In a concurring opinion, one justice noted that "because
no rule-making authority in Texas has expressly authorized such coverage
in criminal cases, trial courts should not permit it in those proceedings. '30
However, the concurring justice noted that because the appellant did not
"show that [television] coverage of his particular case had an adverse im-
pact . . . sufficient to constitute a denial of due process," he concurred
with the majority in denying appellant's claim. 31
In Compton v. State,32 the Texarkana Court of Appeals considered
whether an officer's deviation from the official standards in administering
field sobriety tests would make those tests inadmissible. The appellant
22. Simpson v. State, 119 S.W.3d 262 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
23. Id. at 267 (emphasis added).
24. Id. at 268.
25. Graham v. State, 96 S.W.3d 658 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2003, pet. ref'd).
26. Id. at 660.
27. Id. (quoting Marx v. State, 987 S.W.2d 577, 588 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (Keller, J.,
dissenting)).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 661.
30. Id. at 662 (Ross, J., concurring).
31. Id.
32. Compton v. State, 120 S.W.3d 375 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2003, pet. ref'd).
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claimed that the officer failed to administer the horizontal gage nystag-
mus (HGN) and one-legged stand tests in accordance with the State's
official manual. The court of appeals held that slight deviations from the
manual's standards would not invalidate the tests, but instead considered
the harm any such deviations may have caused.33 Applying this standard,
the court found no error in admitting the tests into evidence. First, the
officer's error in administering the HGN test, doing the tests too quickly,
was insufficient to "automatically undermine" the results because the var-
iations were too small. 34 Second, the officer's error in administering the
one-legged stand test, failing to instruct the appellant not to use his arms
for balance, was harmless because using arms for balance should have
actually improved the appellant's performance on the test.35
In Gonzalez v. State,36 the trial court disqualified the defendant's cho-
sen counsel, finding that counsel had key testimony that made him a po-
tential witness. The defendant appealed, claiming that the
disqualification "violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of his
choice."'37 Appellant was convicted of theft, in which he and others con-
spired to commit insurance fraud by staging car accidents. One of the co-
conspirators, Percy Gonzalez, was the State's key witness. Percy had sev-
eral conversations with Ralph Gonzalez, appellant's attorney, during
which "it was agreed that appellant would pay Percy $10,000. ' '38 Percy
later testified that the payment was an attempt to buy favorable testi-
mony, while attorney Gonzalez argued that the payment was to help
Percy hire an attorney. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that
the possibility of prejudice to the State outweighed the defendant's Sixth
Amendment right, and thus affirmed the disqualification. The court
stated that "the State would have been prejudiced not only by the undue
weight jurors might have attached to counsel's testimony, but also by the
confusion that would most likely have resulted during argument regard-
ing whether counsel was summarizing evidence or further testifying as to
personal knowledge. '39 The court also found the disqualification was
supported by the fact that the defendant may have been prejudiced if, for
example, the State were to impeach the attorney's credibility.40
In Xu v. State,41 the San Antonio Court of Appeals considered an in-
teresting case involving a husband confessing to his wife's murder after
being given his Miranda warnings more than eighteen hours before the
confession. The defendant's wife was brought to the hospital uncon-
scious, and she died soon after. When the police arrived at the hospital,
they informed the defendant of his Miranda rights and interviewed him
33. Id. at 378-79.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 379.
36. Gonzalez v. State, 117 S.W.3d 831 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
37. Id. at 835.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 840.
40. Id.
41. Xu v. State, 100 S.W.3d 408 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, pet. filed).
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about the circumstances of his wife's death, which the medical examiner
later determined was caused by strangulation.42 The following day, the
defendant consented to a search of his home and voluntarily went to the
police station for questioning. Initially, the defendant gave a written
statement indicating that he pushed his wife and that she passed out, but
hours later, after being confronted with evidence that his wife was stran-
gled, the defendant signed a second statement confessing that he "got
really mad and grabbed her by the throat. '43 After the confession, the
police did not immediately obtain an arrest warrant because they feared a
trial court might not admit the defendant's confession at trial if the court
thought that Xu confessed while in custody without receiving the re-
quired Miranda warnings. One of the detectives testified they "would
have had a 'problem with the custodial interrogation,'-Xu's 'statements
[would] come in if [they] let him go home."' 44 Accordingly, the police
permitted him to leave the police station, although they informed the de-
fendant's friends and relatives that he admitted to killing his wife. The
police arrested Xu two days later.45 At trial, the court allowed Xu's con-
fession into evidence, and he was convicted of murdering his wife and
sentenced to twenty-five years in prison.46 The San Antonio Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court's decision because Xu's confession was
the product of a custodial interrogation, and it was improperly admitted
into evidence because he was not given Miranda warnings before making
the statements.47 The court noted that "[a] written statement made by an
accused as a result of custodial interrogation is inadmissible unless it is
shown on the face of the statement that: (1) before making the statement,
the accused received specific warnings from a magistrate or the person to
whom the statement is made and (2) the accused knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily waived the rights set out in the warnings. '48 Because
Xu's written statement did not show that he was given the necessary
warnings or that he waived his rights, his written statement was inadmissi-
ble. In addition, the court of appeals noted that Xu was in "custody"
when he made his written statement because the police had probable
cause to arrest him, and the police did not tell Xu he was free to leave.49
Ultimately, the court of appeals found that it could not "conclude beyond
a reasonable doubt that the erroneous admission of Xu's second state-
ment did not contribute to his conviction" and it reversed the trial court's
judgment and remanded the case for a new trial.50
42. Id. at 410.
43. Id. at 412.
44. Id. (alterations in original).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 410.
47. Id. at 415.
48. Id. at 413 (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22 § 2 (Vernon 1979)).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 416.
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A. EVIDENCE
In Byrd v. State,51 the Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed the appel-
lant's conviction of injury to a child by omission for failing to seek medi-
cal care. Appellant was spanking his seven-year old child when the child
suddenly "went limp."'52 Soon thereafter, the child started to shake, so
the appellant called 911. By the time the medical team arrived, the child
had stopped shaking and was sitting upright and conscious. However, the
medical team found the son with several injuries, including a gash on his
nose, burns on his skin, and numerous bruises.53 Appellant was convicted
and sentenced to five years imprisonment for "injury to a child by omis-
sion, serious bodily injury."'54
Byrd appealed, arguing "that the evidence is factually insufficient to
establish that he committed bodily injury to a child by omission by failing
to seek medical care."' 55 The appellate court disagreed. The court recog-
nized that "it was not sufficient for the State to prove that appellant failed
to provide medical care for a bodily injury. Instead, it was necessary to
prove that [the son] suffered bodily injury because the appellant failed to
provide him medical care."'56 An emergency room doctor testified that if
the nose injury had been timely sutured, the scarring would have been
minimized. Also, the doctor testified that medical treatment of the burns
would have exposed the boy to less pain. Finally, the wrist injury, which
was probably seven to ten days old, could potentially result in a deformity
if left untreated. 57 Appellant admitted that he knew of the injuries, but
evidence indicated that appellant failed to seek medical attention because
he wanted to get insurance first.58 Therefore, the court found that the
evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's conviction. 59
In Ochoa v. State,60 the San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed appel-
lant's conviction and sentence of forty years imprisonment for driving
while intoxicated and for using his vehicle as a deadly weapon. A police
officer noticed Ochoa driving a Suburban erratically.61 The officer
turned on his camera and recorded the vehicle swerving into on-coming
traffic nearly hitting another vehicle. The officer pulled him over and
arrested him. At trial, the jury found that Ochoa used his motor vehicle
as a deadly weapon.
Ochoa appealed, claiming "there [was] insufficient evidence to support
the jury's finding that [he] used his motor vehicle as a deadly weapon. '62
51. Byrd v. State, 112 S.W.3d 675 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, pet. ref'd).
52. Id. at 676.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 677.
55. Id.
56. Id. (citation omitted).
57. Id. at 678.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 679.
60. Ochoa v. State, 119 S.W.3d 825 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003, no pet.).




The appellate court disagreed. A deadly weapon is defined as "anything
that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death
or serious bodily injury."'63 "[T]o sustain a deadly weapon finding[, there
must be] evidence that other people were endangered by the defendant's
use of the vehicle and not merely a hypothetical potential for danger.64
The court concluded that the police officer's testimony and the recording
were sufficient evidence to prove that "other drivers on the road were
actually endangered by defendant's use of his vehicle."'65 Therefore, the
court found "there [was] sufficient evidence to support the deadly
weapon finding."'66
In State v. Mechler,67 the Houston Court of Appeals considered
whether the State is required to provide retrograde extrapolation evi-
dence in order to offer intoxylyzer evidence based on a test administered
one-and-one-half hours after arrest, and whether the results of such a test
would be prejudicial. The State admitted that it did not have sufficient
evidence to extrapolate the results backwards to estimate blood alcohol
content at the time of the arrest. The defendant thus moved to suppress
the results, stating that this failure made the tests irrelevant. The court of
appeals disagreed, relying on other courts of appeals that had found that
the admissibility of intoxilyzer results in a DWI case is prescribed by stat-
ute, and the statute does not mandate extrapolation. 68 The court also
held that the evidence should not be suppressed under Texas Rule of Evi-
dence 403 because the probative value of the test, demonstrating intoxi-
cation, outweighed the potential prejudice of the jury being misled, which
was slight given the defendant's ability to tell the jury about the potential
for error in the test.69
In Dunn v. State,70 the appellant, convicted of aggravated sexual assault
of a child, argued that videotaped interviews of the alleged victims should
not be introduced into evidence because they violated his right to con-
front the witnesses against him. Under Texas statute, statements made by
a child to the first adult person the child told of the offense are not ex-
cludable under the hearsay rule.71 The defendant argued that the state-
ments were made on a videotape, which is not a "person" subject to the
statute and not available for cross-examination. The Texarkana Court of
Appeals first found that the statute did not contemplate the introduction
of videotaped interviews, and thus the statements were excludable hear-
say. 72 But the court found that, because similar testimony was offered by
63. Id. (quoting TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(17)(B) (Vernon 2003)).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 828.
66. Id.
67. State v. Mechler, 123 S.W.3d 449 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet.
filed).
68. Id. at 452.
69. Id. at 454-57.
70. Dunn v. State, 125 S.W.3d 610 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2003, no pet. h.).
71. Id. at 612 (citing TEX. CODE. CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.072 (Vernon Supp. 2004)).
72. Id. at 613.
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the witnesses live and subject to cross-examination, such error in the ad-
mission of the videotapes was harmless. 73
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals championed the Brady rule in
Arroyo v. State.74 The defendant was charged with misdemeanor assault.
In accordance with the Brady rule, which requires "the State 'to disclose
the arrest and conviction records of each witness' the State intend[s] to
call at trial" upon motion by the defendant, the State turned over the rap
sheet of the victim. 75 The defendant then "attempted to impeach [the
victim's] credibility with evidence that she had a criminal record." 76
Ironically, the State argued that the rap sheets should not be admissible
as impeachment evidence because they were not relevant. The reason
the exhibits were not relevant, according to the State, was because the
defendant "had not demonstrated that [the victim] and the person(s)
mentioned in the exhibits were one and the same."'77 The trial court ex-
cluded the proffered exhibits from evidence, and the San Antonio Court
of Appeals upheld the trial court's decision.
The Court of Criminal Appeals granted the petition for discretionary
review. The court stated that "[w]e have recognized before that a party
may be estopped from asserting a claim that is inconsistent with that
party's prior conduct. ' 78 Since the State provided the rap sheets and
gave no indication that the information on the rap sheets was incorrect,
the State could not then claim the exhibits should be inadmissible on the
grounds of identity. Thus, the court vacated the lower court's judgment
and remanded the case for further proceedings. 79
In Rodriguez v. State,80 the defendant was charged with delivering co-
caine to a minor-his daughter to be specific. Defendant's daughter testi-
fied that he had given "cocaine to her 'maybe [twenty] to [thirty] times'
during the nine-month period preceeding [the] date" defendant was
charged.81 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals addressed two interest-
ing issues in this case: (1) whether the minor's testimony of the other
incidents where defendant had given her cocaine was evidence extrane-
ous to the offense charged; and (2) whether the minor can be an accom-
plice to the delivery of cocaine. The court answered "no" to both
questions.82
As to the first issue, the court looked to well-settled precedent to hold
that the daughter's testimony of the twenty to thirty other times the de-
fendant had delivered cocaine to her was not inadmissible as extraneous
73. Id. at 615.
74. Arroyo v. State, 117 S.W.3d 795 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003, pet. filed).
75. Id. at 796 (internal citations omitted).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 797.
78. Id. at 798.
79. Id.
80. Rodriguez v. State, 104 S.W.3d 87 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
81. Id. at 88.
82. Id. at 91.
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offense evidence.83 The court stated that the defendant's "remedy was to
require the State to elect the occurrence on which it sought to rely for
conviction. ' 84 According to the court, "the benefit a defendant receives
in cases like this is that, absent an election, he cannot later be prosecuted
for the separate acts of misconduct upon which the jury could have con-
victed the defendant."8 5
As to the second issue, the court indicated that it would be absurd to
hold the recipient of the cocaine to be an accomplice to the offense of
delivering cocaine. Although the defendant could not be guilty of the
offense without his daughter's participation in receiving the cocaine, she
could "not [aid in] the 'delivering act' by [defendant]. '8 6 The court cites
the exception to accomplice liability discussed in Robinson v. State, which
is that "the crime is so defined that participation by another is inevitably
incident to its commission."'8 7 Therefore, the court holds that while the
daughter might be guilty of some other offense, she cannot be guilty as an
accomplice to the charge against her father of "delivering" cocaine to a
minor.88
In Resendiz v. State,8 9 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed
appellant's conviction of capital murder. Resendiz appealed, claiming
"he was denied a fair trail [because] the trial court refused to admit scene
photographs relating to extraneous murder offenses committed by"
Resendiz into evidence. 90 An expert witness, relying partly on the photo-
graphs of the extraneous crime scenes, testified that he believed appellant
was insane due to the manner in which the crimes had been perpe-
trated.91 When the defense attempted to admit the photographs into evi-
dence, the State objected, arguing "that the photographs were not
relevant because the question ... was whether appellant was insane at the
time he committed [the] murder [in question], [and] not [whether he was
insane at the time of] the murders depicted in the photographs. ' 92 The
trial court sustained the objection and the photographs were not
admitted.
The appellate court affirmed. Although it found the photographs to be
relevant, it stated that the relevant evidence should be excluded because
its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of confus-
ing the issues or misleading the jury.93 The majority opinion of the appel-
83. Id. (citing Sledge v. State, 953 S.W.2d 253 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Rankin v. State,
953 S.W.2d 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 92.
87. Id. (quoting Robinson v. State, 815 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, no
pet.)
88. Id.
89. Resendiz v. State, 112 S.W.3d 541 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (en banc).
90. Id. at 544.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 545-46.
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late court believed that the photographs could distract the jury on facts
tangential to the case before it. It stated that the evidence's probative
value was limited because merely viewing the photographs would not
prove legal insanity. It further stated that after viewing the evidence, the
jury could confuse legally insane with "crazy." That is, the court argues
that even though the photographs could show "that appellant had com-
mitted acts unthinkable to most 'normal' people, [they did not disprove
the fact] that appellant did not know his conduct was wrong" when he
committed the murder in question.94
The dissenting opinion took issue with the exclusion of the photo-
graphs. 95 The dissent argued that the evidence would not have distracted
the jurors. Further, it believed that the correct inquiry should have been
whether the photographs would distract the jurors from the contested is-
sue-the appellant's insanity.96 The dissent also argued that the evidence
did not need to prove insanity outright, as suggested by the majority, but
it need only have any tendency to make the existence of the fact more or
less probable. The dissenting opinion further believed that the jurors
would not have confused abnormality and legal insanity. In fact, the dis-
sent believed that the evidence of abnormality could tend to prove legal
insanity. Therefore, the dissenting opinion believed that the court should
have admitted the photographs of the extraneous crime scenes. 97
In Bustamante v. State,98 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed
appellant's conviction of capital murder. Bustamante appealed, arguing
among other points of error that he "should have [been] granted a mis-
trial or a new trial [due to the jury's] receipt of evidence that was not
admitted at trial."99 During the course of investigation of the robbery
and murder of the victim, the police obtained a signed, written statement
from appellant's brother.100 During trial, the court ordered the brother
to testify, granting him immunity for any testimony given. However, the
brother refused to testify and the trial court held him in contempt. 10 1
The State had marked the brother's written statement as Exhibit 107,
but it was never admitted into evidence. 10 2 Later, another item was
marked as Exhibit 107 and admitted into evidence. Both items were in-
cluded as exhibits in the jury room. During deliberations, the letter was
read aloud by one of the jurors as the rest listened "with varying degrees
of attentiveness. '10 3 Thereafter, several jury members became concerned
about whether the brother's statement was proper before the jury. The
trial judge had the statement removed as soon as it was discovered that
94. Id. at 545.
95. Id. at 552 (Womack, J., dissenting).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 554.
98. Bustamante v. State, 106 S.W.3d 738 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
99. Id. at 742-43.






the statement was in the jury room. The trial judge then questioned each
juror individually. 10 4 "[A]ll twelve jurors said that they could completely
disregard the exhibit if instructed to do so.' 10 5 After individual question-
ing, the trial judge instructed the jurors as a group to disregard the writ-
ten statement. After the jury was sent back to deliberate, the appellant
moved for a mistrial, which was denied. The jury came back with a guilty
verdict for capital murder. The appellant then moved for a new trial,
which was also denied.106
The appellate court affirmed the conviction after applying a two-pro-
nged test. In order to obtain a new trial due to the jury's receipt of evi-
dence not admitted at trial, "(1) the evidence must be received by the
jury, and (2) the evidence must be detrimental or adverse to the defen-
dant.'10 7 The appellate court found that the first prong had not been
satisfied. The trial court took proper measures after it discovered that the
brother's statement was before the jury. It met with each juror individu-
ally and each stated that he or she could disregard the statement. The
court then gave an instruction to the group to disregard the evidence.
Therefore, it was as though the evidence was never "'received' by the
jury. 10 8 Therefore, the trial court properly denied a new trial.
Under Texas Rule of Evidence 803(24), statements made by an under-
age female to her parent with regards to sexual activity with an adult are
admissible. 10 9 In Glover v. State, the Texarkana Court of Appeals deter-
mined that the statements against social interests are sufficiently reliable
for purposes of the Confrontation Clause because "she knew her state-
ments would subject her to disgrace in the eyes of her mother."110 The
court opined that the situation provided a basis for the jury to assess the
credibility of her statements and that the defense was also able to test the
evidence by offering an alternative explanation for her statements.111
In Otto v. State,1 2 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals upheld the
conviction of two defendants for organized criminal activity relating to
the aggravated kidnapping of two people. The appellants served as of-
ficers in the Republic of Texas, an organization whose members believe
that Texas is a sovereign nation. Before the kidnapping, the victims an-
gered members of the Republic of Texas by telling the sheriff that mem-
bers of the group often carried automatic weapons. 113 The victims
104. Id. at 742.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 743 (citing Eckert v. State, 623 S.W.2d 359, 364 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981),
overruled on other grounds, Reed v. State, 744 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988); Ste-
phenson v. State, 571 S.W.2d 174, 176 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978)).
108. Id. at 744.
109. Glover v. State, 102 S.W.3d 754 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. ref'd) (referenc-
ing TEX. R. EVID. 802(24)).
110. Id. at 768.
111. Id.
112. Otto v. State, 95 S.W.3d 282, 283 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (en banc).
113. Id. at 283-84.
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contacted the sheriff regarding a van they saw near their house, and the
sheriff arrested the driver. That same day, three heavily-armed Republic
of Texas members stormed the victims' house and shot one of the victims
through his front door. The members "placed the victims 'under arrest'
and held them captive until the Texas Rangers negotiated their release
[later] that evening. 1 14 "Although the appellants were not present at the
kidnapping, they were centrally involved."115 The kidnappers used one
of the defendant's vehicles during the kidnapping, they helped plan the
kidnapping and they were in radio contact with the kidnappers, directing
their behavior.116
A jury convicted the appellants of organized criminal activity under
Texas Penal Code Section 71.02.117 The El Paso Court of Appeals over-
turned the appellants' convictions on the basis that the evidence did not
indicate that they committed an overt act during the kidnapping, a re-
quired element of the crime. However, the Texas Court of Criminal Ap-
peals disagreed. It found the State's argument, that the law of the parties
should apply to the appellants, persuasive because the evidence indicated
that the appellants directed, encouraged, and aided in committing the
kidnapping.1 18 The court of criminal appeals stated that since the "'overt
act' element of organized criminal activity need not be criminal in itself,
acts that suffice for party liability - those that encourage, solicit, direct,
aid or attempt to aid in the commission of the underlying offense" satis-
fied the overt act requirement of the organized crime statute. 119 Accord-
ingly, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the court of appeal's
decision to overturn the convictions.' 20
In Ex Parte Taylor,121 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals considered
whether collateral estoppel barred the State from relitigating the ultimate
issue of intoxication, regardless of whether the State alleged a different
type of intoxicant. In this case, the prosecution could not bring another
manslaughter charge because in the first trial the defendant had prevailed
on the broad issue of whether he was intoxicated. 122 The source of the
appellant's intoxication was not a disputed issue, just the fact of intoxica-
tion.123 Therefore, the court concluded that "there is no reasonable pos-
sibility that the jury in the first trial could have decided ... that appellant
was intoxicated but not because of alcohol."12 4
114. Id. at 284.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 283-84.
118. Id. at 284.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 285.
121. Ex parte Taylor, 101 S.W.3d 434, 436 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (en banc).
122. Id. at 443.
123. Id.
124. Id. (emphasis in original).
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B. JURY CHARGE AND ARGUMENT
In Thompson v. State,125 the Houston Court of Appeals reversed a
punishment sentence due to the prosecutor's jury argument stating
"'there's something important that I cannot tell you about concerning
why you should not give [appellant] anything less than ten years."1 26
The court found this argument "by its very nature inflammatory" and that
an instruction to disregard would not have a curative effect. 127
In Watts v. State,' 28 a case involving the discharge of raw sewage into
public water, the trial judge took judicial notice of a similar case in open
court immediately before reading the jury charge. The trial judge stated
the following:
the Court will take judicial notice that the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals ...found that [in a] case where evidence showed that a
pollutant escaped from the premises onto an adjacent field that
formed a large pool and then flowed into a drainage ditch that in that
case the drainage ditch was one of the types of surface water the
legislature sought to protect under the Water Code Act.
129
The jury found the defendant guilty under Texas Water Code Section
26.121(a)(1) for "discharging raw sewage from a broken septic tank ...
into 'water in the state,"1130 a required element of the crime, and he was
sentenced "to one year in [jail], probated for two years, and a $10,000
fine."1 31
The defendant appealed the verdict, claiming that the trial judge erred
when she took judicial notice of statements contained in a Court of Crim-
inal Appeals opinion regarding drainage ditches being one of the types of
surface water that the legislature intended to protect in the presence of
the jury. Appellant argued the notice "constituted an improper comment
on the weight of the evidence."'1 32 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
agreed, holding that the trial judge erred by improperly commenting on
the weight of the evidence.' 33 The court distinguished between a judge
taking judicial notice of adjudicative facts and taking judicial notice of the
law. Adjudicative facts that are relevant to the ultimate issue in dispute
may be judicially noticed, but they cannot be the subject of the contro-
versy themselves. 34 In addition, the court noted that it is appropriate for
judges to take judicial notice of previous cases, but not in the presence of
the jury. Ultimately, the court reversed the judgment of the Houston
125. Thompson v. State, 89 S.W.3d 843, 856 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet.
ref'd).
126. Id. at 848.
127. Id. at 851.
128. Watts v. State, 99 S.W.3d 604 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
129. Id. at 607.
130. Id. at 606.
131. Id. at 608.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 613.
134. Id. at 610.
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Court of Appeals and remanded the case for a harm analysis. 135
In Midence v. State,136 the Houston Court of Appeals reversed the ap-
pellant's conviction of assault on a public servant and remanded for a
new trial. Appellant, a prison inmate, was charged with assaulting two
correctional officers. 137 The trial court's charge to the jury instructed the
jury to find appellant guilty if they found appellant had assaulted either
one officer or the other.
The inmate appealed, arguing that the jury charge was harmfully erro-
neous. The appellate court agreed, stating that the charge should not
have been stated in the disjunctive. 138 The jury charge was erroneous
because it "allowed the possibility of six jurors convicting appellant of the
assault on [only one officer] and six jurors convicting appellant of the
assault on [the other officer]."'1 39 The court concluded that the error was
harmful because it allowed a jury to return a non-unanimous verdict.140
C. PUNISHMENT
[A]n affirmative finding of the use or exhibition of a deadly weapon
. . . against a defendant who never used or brandished a deadly
weapon during the commission of the offense [is authorized] so long
as he (1) was a party to an offense where a deadly weapon was used
or exhibited and (2) knew such a weapon would be used or
exhibited. 141
In Sarmiento v. State, the Houston Court of Appeals overruled its prior
decisions, which suggested that the defendant must have pulled the trig-
ger; there could be no implied findings of the use or exhibition of a
deadly weapon. 142
For purposes of sentence enhancement, a prior conviction only be-
comes final when the appellate court issues its mandate affirming the con-
viction. 143 In Beal v. State, the defendant challenged his enhanced
sentence because the prior offense that was used to enhance his sentence
was pending appeal.1 44 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals overruled
precedent: "We decline to adhere to a decision that creates the potential
for making an indictment's enhancement allegations untrue. We, there-
fore, overrule Rener and hold that an appealed conviction alleged in an
indictment for enhancement purposes becomes final when the appellate
court issues its mandate affirming the conviction. '1 45
135. Id. at 613.
136. Midence v. State, 108 S.W.3d 564 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.).




141. Sarmiento v. State, 93 S.W.3d 566, 569 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet.
ref'd) (en banc).
142. Id. at 568.
143. Beal v. State, 91 S.W.3d 794, 794 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 796.
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In Chapman v. State,146 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed
appellant's conviction of aggravated sexual assault and indecency with a
child. While on probation for an earlier sex offense conviction, appellant
confessed that he had sexually molested two young girls for which he had
never been tried. 147 His probation terms required that he attend sex of-
fender treatment programs. Program requirements included good faith
participation and full disclosure of information relevant to his rehabilita-
tion. During the treatment, Chapman informed his therapist that he had
molested two girls.1 48 The therapist informed his probation officer. The
probation officer met with Chapman, and again he confessed the acts and
also provided the names of the victims. 149 The probation officer in-
formed the police, and Chapman was later charged and sentenced to
twenty years in prison after pleading guilty to the two offenses.
Chapman appealed, arguing that the trial court should have dismissed
the charges because the State had violated his right against compelled
self-incrimination. 150 He alleged that the treatment program required
him to reveal his past sexual history. As a result, he claimed he was
forced to choose between waiving his Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination and revoking his probation.
The Court of Criminal Appeals disagreed. The court recognized that
normally a party must affirmatively invoke his right against self-incrimi-
nation. However, the classic penalty situation exception applies, and af-
firmative invocation is not necessary, if "a person is threatened with
punishment for relying on his Fifth Amendment privilege. '15 1 After re-
viewing the United States Supreme Court case of Minnesota v. Mur-
phy,152 the Court of Criminal Appeals determined that that case was
directly applicable. 153 The court concluded "that appellant was not sub-
jected to a classic penalty situation" because the State authorities never
stated "that appellant's probation would be revoked if he chose to invoke
his Fifth Amendment privilege. ' 154 Further, the therapist never asked
appellant directly about his sexual history. In other words, appellant was
never put into a dilemma where he must confess his sex offenses or be
punished. The court concludes that if appellant had been put in that situ-
ation, he could have invoked his privilege without having his probation
revoked. Therefore, the court held that appellant's Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination was not violated and his conviction was
146. Chapman v. State, 115 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
147. Id. at 3.
148. Appellant admitted that the catalyst for his disclosures was his reading of a book
that has the purpose of helping child sexual abuse offenders empathize with their victims.
Id. at 4.
149. Id. at 3.
150. Id. at 5.
151. Id. at 6.
152. Minn. v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984).
153. Chapman, 115 S.W.3d at 8.
154. Id.
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affirmed. 155
III. APPEAL
Although a majority of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied
the petitioner's motion for an extension of time to file a motion for re-
hearing in Franks v. State, the case is still noteworthy because four dis-
senting judges in the case discussed a "trap for the unwary" that is
contained in "Rules 49.1, 49.7 and 68.2 of the Texas Rules of Appellate
Procedure" that justified granting the appellant's request for rehear-
ing.156 The dissent stated that "[t]he language of these rules constitutes a
booby trap which may ensnare both the State and the defendant. 157
The interplay between the timeframes for filing appeals discussed in
various appellate rules leads to confusion regarding when motions for re-
hearing and reconsideration must be filed. First, Rule 49.1 permits
a party to file motions for rehearing within fifteen days of [a] court's
judgment or order. Under Rule 48.9, a party may also file for an
extension of time in which to file [a] motion for rehearing. [In addi-
tion,] Rule 49.7 allows a party to file a motion for reconsideration en
banc. There is, however, no specific time limit set out in Rule 49.7.
Thus, a request for reconsideration en banc may be filed at any time
while the court of appeals still has plenary jurisdiction.1 58
Finally, Rule 68.2 addresses the time periods for filing a petition for dis-
cretionary review ("PDR") with the Court of Criminal Appeals. Under
68.2, the timetables for filing a PDR are tolled until the court of appeals
either denies or grants a motion for rehearing, "no other motion will toll
the time period.1' 59 The dissent noted that "[i]t is the use of the phrase
'en banc' without citation to Rule 49.1 which controls whether the time
period in which to file a PDR is tolled or not."1 60 It appears that if a
motion for rehearing contains the words "en banc" without specifically
mentioning Rule 49.1, a party has only thirty days to file a PDR after the
court of appeals renders its original decision, but if Rule 49.1 is men-
tioned, and then the time is tolled.
Because of this confusion, the dissenting judges provided the following
guidelines to parties wishing to appeal:
* eliminate the phrase "en banc" from the title.
* always title the document "Motion for Rehearing."
* always add a reference to Rule 49.1 in the motion.
* never refer to Rule 49.7 in the title of the motion.
* alternatively, file two separate documents. Title the first one
"Motion for Rehearing under Rule 49.1" and file it within fifteen
days after the court of appeals renders its decision. File a second,
155. Id. at 11.
156. Franks v. State, 97 S.W.3d 584 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (Cochran, J., dissenting).
157. Id.
158. Id. (internal citations omitted).




separate document either earlier, later, or at the same time, titled
"Motion for Reconsideration En Banc under Rule 49.7."161
Ultimately, the dissent noted that because the interplay between the vari-
ous appellate rules was less than obvious, the appellant's motion for re-
hearing should have been granted.162
In Monreal v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that a
defendant that enters into "a valid, non-negotiated waiver of appeal" may
not appeal "any issue without the consent of the trial court. ' 163 Alfredo
Monreal, Jr. pled guilty to aggravated robbery without a plea bargain.
Judgment was rendered by the trial court, and seven days later Monreal
"signed a waiver of his right to appeal.' 64 His attorney then filed an
appeal less than a month later, and "Monreal himself filed a pro se notice
of appeal.' 65 Predictably, "the State filed a motion in the court of ap-
peals to dismiss Monreal's appeal. '166
Monreal's appeal was dismissed by the Fort Worth Court of Appeals
due to the waiver. The Court of Criminal Appeals granted review.
Monreal argued that consent of the trial court should not be required to
appeal, because he signed a non-negotiated waiver of appeal. The Court
of Criminal Appeals disagreed.1 67
"Article 1.14 of the [Code of Criminal Procedure] provides that a de-
fendant in a non-capital felony case may waive any right secured to him
by law."' 168 After reviewing some of the previous case law, the court fol-
lowed the Helms rule, extended by Young, in holding that the test to be
applied is "whether the waiver was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelli-
gently made. ' 169 The court stated that:
When asked to choose between a rule stating that a waiver of appeal
is binding unless and until the defendant files a notice of appeal and
a rule stating that a valid waiver of appeal is binding on the defen-
dant and will prevent the defendant from appealing without the con-
sent of the trial court, we have consistently opted for the latter.1 70
The court went on to say that the "decision has never been based on
whether the defendant received some benefit in exchange for the waiver,
but rather on whether, as the rule states, the waiver was voluntary, intelli-
gent, and knowing, and thus valid.' 71
The court, therefore, upheld the court of appeals's dismissal of
Monreal's appeal. Monreal also attempted to argue that the court of ap-
161. Id.
162. Id. at 586.




167. Id. at 616.
168. Id. at 617.
169. Id. at 619 (applying the test from Helms v. State, 484 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. Crim. App.
1972) and Young v. State, 8 S.W.3d 656 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)).
170. Id. at 622.
171. Id.
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peals should have allowed him to amend his appeal to ask permission of
the trial court to let him appeal his waiver. However, the court of crimi-
nal appeals held that the lower court did not err in denying the amend-
ment to his notice of appeal, "because Monreal waited until after he had
filed his appellate brief to request the court of appeals' permission to
amend the notice of appeal. '172
In an interesting case involving a Chapter 64 DNA challenge, 173 the
Dallas Court of Appeals held that the State may not "appeal a trial
court's finding that a post-conviction DNA test is favorable to a convicted
person. ' 174 Under the statute, the legislature has not authorized such an
appeal by the State, according to the court. Therefore, the court found
that it had no jurisdiction over the case and dismissed the appeal. 175
"James Douglas Waller filed a motion for post-conviction DNA testing
pursuant to Chapter 64 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. 1 76
The DNA test was conducted and the findings were favorable to Waller.
The State appealed, and Waller filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for
lack of jurisdiction.
The legislature has set out the instances in which the State can appeal a
criminal case in statute. "[A]rticle 44.01 of the Code of Criminal Proce-
dure [is] the only 'general law' authorizing the State to appeal in a 'crimi-
nal case." 177 After stating that a Chapter 64 DNA proceeding is a
criminal case, the court found that "article 44.01 currently does not au-
thorize the State to appeal a post-conviction DNA favorable finding
under Chapter 64."178
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals determined in Bayless v. State179
that Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2(d) permits a defendant to
file an amended notice of appeal any time before the defendant's brief is
filed.180 In Bayless, the defendant entered into a negotiated plea and
then two days later filed a general notice of appeal. 181 Then, "[a]fter the
time for filing the notice of appeal had expired, but prior to the filing of
her brief, the [defendant] filed an amended notice containing the notice
of appeal requirements under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25. ''182
The court determined that the defendant's actions were sufficient to give
the Dallas Court of Appeals jurisdiction to hear her appeal. 183
172. Id. at 622-23.
173. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.01 (Vernon Supp. 2003).
174. State v. Waller, 104 S.W.3d 307, 309 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, pet. ref'd).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 308.
177. Id.
178. Id. (internal citation omitted).
179. Bayless v. State, 91 S.W.3d 801 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
180. Id. at 803.
181. Id. at 802.
182. Id. at 802-03 (citing TEX. R. App. P. 25.2(b)(3)).
183. Id. at 806.
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IV. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
In Rylander v. State,'1 84 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals showed
once again how difficult it is for a defendant to be successful in an appeal
for ineffective assistance of counsel. 185 Although the court did not di-
rectly decide whether defendant's counsel was ineffective, and indicated
that the defendant could raise the issue in an application for a writ of
habeas corpus, the court held "that the court of appeals erred in holding
that [the defendant] was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel at
trial. 186
The defendant was charged with three counts of aggravated assault for
striking several cars and people in a bar parking lot with his truck after an
altercation. Defendant claimed that he had a medical condition that pre-
vented him from forming the intent the State accused him of. Due to
diabetes and severe head trauma suffered in a motorcycle accident, the
defendant claimed he suffered memory lapses and did not even remem-
ber the incident for which he was charged. 187
Defendant argued that his counsel was ineffective under the Strickland
standard for failing to introduce evidence at trial that would support his
only defense-that his actions were not voluntary and/or he could not be
held culpable for his actions. Specifically, defendant complained that his
counsel did not introduce any "qualified medical testimony in support of
that defense, but rather sought to submit such testimony through non-
medical witnesses, whose testimony .. . the trial court disallowed. '18 8
Defendant's counsel also had many other failings before trial and during
the punishment phase, which the San Antonio Court of Appeals cited as
support for finding ineffective assistance of counsel. 189
Although the Court of Criminal Appeals recognized that the above in-
cidents "raise questions as to the wisdom and rationale for certain trial
preparation and trial strategy decisions," the court stated that "because
the ineffective assistance claim is raised on direct appeal, trial counsel has
not had an opportunity to respond to these areas of concern."'190 The
court deemed "a writ of habeas corpus [to be] 'the more appropriate ve-
hicle' to raise [an] ineffective assistance of counsel claim." 191 The court
held that the first prong of the Strickland test was not met here because
trial counsel was not given the opportunity to explain his actions. Also,
"the record on direct appeal will generally 'not be sufficient to show that
counsel's representation was so deficient as to meet the first part of the
Strickland standard' as '[t]he reasonableness of counsel's choices often
184. Rylander v. State, 101 S.W.3d 107 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (en banc).
185. Id. at 110.
186. Id. at 111.
187. Id. at 109.
188. Id. at 110.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. (citing Mitchell v. State, 68 S.W.3d 640, 642 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)).
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involves facts that do not appear in the appellate record."' 192
A dissent by Justice Meyers questions why the court chose to dispose
of the claim rather than analyzing it. "[I]f counsel's errors were so obvi-
ously unprofessional then there should be no need for an explanation of
his subjective intent." 193
V. HABEAS CORPUS
In Ex parte Hale,194 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals decided, en
banc, whether a prisoner who was erroneously released on mandatory
supervision should be given credit for that time as if spent incarcerated.
Petitioner was sentenced to seven years imprisonment for burglary, and
while incarcerated was convicted for carrying a weapon in prison, which
carried an eight-year sentence that would not begin until after his original
sentence had run. However, the applicant was twice erroneously released
to mandatory supervision, and thus spent nearly six-years out of jail when
he should have been in jail. He was subsequently arrested for violation of
the conditions of his mandatory supervision. The applicant argued he
should be given credit against his sentence as if he had spent that time in
prison because it was not his fault that he had left prison when he was
told to do so. The court agreed that the applicant was not at fault, but
held that his release was a "highly desired alternative to incarceration"
and under the statute that applied at the time of his release, he should not
be given credit for that time.195 The court held that a person who is erro-
neously released should be treated not as an inmate but as a releasee, and
the applicant would not be given credit for the time he spent as such if his
release was revoked. 196
In Ex parte Jones,197 a prisoner, who plead guilty to burglary and was
sentenced to twenty-five years in prison, filed a writ of habeas corpus
application claiming that his attorney provided ineffective assistance of
counsel by failing to pursue an insanity defense. Although this case
sounds like many others, it has a unique twist. The applicant attached to
his writ application documents bearing the Texas State Seal and a doc-
tor's signature, indicating that the applicant had an 10 of 26, is autistic,
and suffers from another serious mental disorder. 198 The State re-
sponded with proof that these documents were, in fact, false and fraudu-
lent. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found that "the applicant has
abused The Great Writ" and that the applicant "may have committed
forgery" by creating the false documents. 199 The court noted that if the
applicant is convicted of an offense while in prison, the trial court shall
192. Id. (quoting Mitchell, 68 S.W.3d at 642 (modifications in original)).
193. Id. at 111 (Meyers, J., dissenting).
194. Ex parte Hale, 117 S.W.3d 866 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (en banc).
195. Id. at 872.
196. Id.
197. Ex parte Jones, 97 S.W.3d 586 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (per curiam).
198. Id. at 587.
199. Id. at 588.
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"stack" the sentences, so he will have to complete his first sentence
before starting his second. Finally, the court noted that the denial of a
frivolous writ will bar the applicant from additional applications except in
extraordinary situations.200
In Ex parte Tuley, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that a
defendant's guilty plea does not later prevent him from claiming actual
innocence in a habeas corpus proceeding.20' In this case, the applicant
had pled guilty to charges of aggravated sexual assault after his jury was
deadlocked. 20 2 While serving time, the applicant found out that the vic-
tim recanted the story.20 3 He sought to collaterally attack his conviction
based on actual innocence. 20 4 He stated that he had only pled guilty be-
cause he could not make bail or keep his retained lawyer. 20 5 The court
was "convinced by clear and convincing evidence that no rational jury
would convict the applicant in light of the new evidence. ' 20 6
VI. MANDAMUS
In Winters v. Presiding Judge of the Criminal District Court Number
Three of Tarrant County,20 7 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held
that an inmate must be appointed counsel if requested when the inmate
applies for DNA testing pursuant to Chapter 64 of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure. 20 8 Here, the defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated
sexual assault and was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment. While
imprisoned, he moved for DNA testing. The trial court denied the mo-
tion and defendant's request for counsel. In response to relation's appli-
cation for writ of mandamus, the trial court stated that it denied
appointment of counsel because it was highly unlikely that such testing
would have produced any relevant evidence. The Court of Criminal Ap-
peals found that, "notwithstanding the improbability of obtaining relief,
appointment of counsel is mandatory" under the express terms of the
statute. 20 9 The court found that, while there was no constitutional right
to counsel for a post-conviction collateral attack, Article 64 granted a
statutory right by stating that "[a] convicted person is entitled to counsel
during a proceeding under this chapter ... if the court determines that
the person is indigent, the court shall appoint counsel for the person, ' 210
and "no wording in the statute gives a judge the discretion to deny [coun-
sel] merely because the judge concludes that doing so would be
200. Id. at 589.
201. Ex parte Tuley, 109 S.W.3d 388, 390 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
202. Id. at 389-90.
203. Id. at 390.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 395.
206., Id. at 397.
207. Winters v. Presiding Judge of the Dist. Court Number Three of Tarrant County,
118 S.W.3d 773 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
208. Id. at 774.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 775 (quoting TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 64.01(c) (Vernon Supp. 2003)).
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'useless.' "211
In Bell v. State, a seemingly contradictory case, the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals held that people convicted of murder are not guaran-
teed post conviction DNA testing pursuant to Chapter 64 of the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure. 212 The court looked at the legislative his-
tory of Chapter 64 and determined "that the legislature intended to re-
quire that a convicted person demonstrate to the trial court that a
reasonable probability exists that DNA tests would prove his or her
innocence." 213
In Cravin v. State, the Houston Court of Appeals held that a defen-
dant's absence from post-conviction DNA proceedings does not implicate
the Confrontation Clause. 214 In this case, the court analogized DNA pro-
ceedings to habeas corpus proceedings and found that "an applicant for a
post-conviction DNA proceeding enjoys neither a presumption of inno-
cence nor a constitutional right to be present at a hearing." 215
211. Id.
212. Bell v. State, 90 S.W.3d 301, 308 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (en banc).
213. Id. at 306 (citing Kutzner v. State, 75 S.W.3d 427, 438 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)).
214. Cravin v. State, 95 S.W.3d 506, 510 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet.
ref'd).
215. Id. (citing Ex parte Mines, 26 S.W.3d 910, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)).
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